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In early September 2014, we were the ﬁrst to publicly
llenge the guidelines of the World Health Organization
HO), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
C) and those of many countries which suggested that
dical masks be used by health care workers (HCWs)
ting Ebola virus disease (EVD) (MacIntyre et al., 2014a).
 argued in a previous editorial in the International
rnal of Nursing Studies that in situations where there is
ertainty around the transmission mode, a risk analysis
ework should be used to select personal protective
ipment (PPE) and that the safety of HCWs should be a
rity (MacIntyre et al., 2014a). Our editorial attracted
siderable attention and comment (Jackson, 2014;
cIntyre et al., 2014b; Martin-Moreno et al., 2014).
 CDC has since changed their guidelines, but the WHO
 yet to do so (CDC, 2014a). In this paper we discuss the
nts that inﬂuenced the modiﬁcation of EVD guidelines
 factors to be considered in developing frameworks for
tection of HCWs.
The current epidemic of Ebola is a global health
astrophe, with the number of cases exceeding 19,000
December 2014 (WHO, 2014a,b). Ofﬁcial ﬁgures are
hly likely to be underestimated because many cases are
 reaching health-care facilities or being reported. This is
nprecedented epidemic, being the largest in history; the
t time Ebola has occurred in more than one country
ultaneously; the ﬁrst time it has affected urban areas and
ital cities; and the ﬁrst time it has been transmitted
outside of Africa (WHO, 2014b). To date around 666 HCWs
have been infected and more than half have died (WHO,
2014b). This level of infection requires a more comprehen-
sive analysis of risk-including the health status of health
professionals, which may include increased susceptibility of
certain individuals. In many countries, particularly in Africa,
HCWs may be living with HIV and other health conditions
which impair immunity (Connelly et al., 2007; WHO,
2014c).
As long as the Ebola epidemic is uncontrolled in West
Africa, there will be an ongoing risk of travel-related cases
being imported into other countries (Tatem et al., 2006). One
such case has already occurred in the United States (US) and
led to the infection of two nurses who were infected despite
apparently following guidelines for personal protective
equipment. Initially it was suggested that their infections
were due to breaches in protocol (Dart, 2014), however,
there is no evidence to prove how or why they became
infected, and the nurses themselves do not recall any breach
(AP, 2014). The cause of their infection may equally have
been inadequate protocols for PPE (MacIntyre et al.,
2014a,b). In this regard many of these guidelines have
failed to consider the voluminous amount of excreta and
also the degree of exposure of nurses that care for
individuals who are seriously ill (Berry and Davidson, 2006).
Until October 2014, the US Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), recommended medical masks for protection of
HCWs treating Ebola (MacIntyre et al., 2014a). In addition,
ords:
la virus diseases (EVD)
ction control (IC)
lthcare workers (HCWs)
onal protective equipment (PPE)
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protective wear for Ebola which appeared to be the same as
those for other non-lethal infections (CDC, 2014b). These
suggested only a single pair of gloves, and suggested that
the second glove be removed by hooking a bare ﬁnger
under the glove. Given the gloves are likely to be the most
contaminated item of PPE, this would pose a high risk of
contamination of the bare ﬁnger. These guidelines also
failed to mention protective head covering, boots or
footwear. It appeared that many aspects of HCW protec-
tion against Ebola, including the most critical aspects of
protection against direct contact were not considered even
after several cases of Ebola had been treated in the US.
These guidelines also did not consider the complex
psychomotor processes of donning and dofﬁng as well
as individual health care worker characteristics, including
fatigue and potential comorbid conditions (MacIntyre et
al., 2014a). Disappointingly there was a climate of naming
and shaming of victims, fuelled largely by the popular
media and clouding the importance of evidence-based
recommendations.
Canadian health authorities responded by recommend-
ing more stringent personal protection requirements
(Public Health Agency of Canada, 2014). Under increasing
scrutiny following the infection of two nurses and with
advocacy by nurses, the CDC has changed their guidelines
on October 21st to include double gloving, respirators as
well as head and foot protection (CDC, 2014a). The donning
and dofﬁng poster was also removed after being publicly
challenged in the media (Orwellian, 2014), and replaced
with a video demonstrating donning and dofﬁng techni-
ques (Medscape, 2014). In contrast, the WHO issued
updated guidelines at the end of October 2014 for PPE
against ﬁloviruses, which retained the previous recom-
mendation for medical masks for health workers caring for
Ebola patients (WHO, 2014d). The October updates
contained no substantive changes except for changing
double-gloving from an optional consideration to being
recommended. The WHO recommends covering the
mouth, nose and eyes to protect the mucosal surfaces
and to cover hands to prevent infection through contact.
Duckbill or cup shaped medical masks are recommended
for HCWs so that they do not collapse against the mouth.
Practically these types of medical masks are not commonly
used in the healthcare setting. A respirator is only
recommended by the WHO when conducting an aerosol
generating procedure (AGP). No explanation is offered as to
why there is a lower level of protection than that suggested
in the 1998 version of the WHO guidelines, which
recommended respirators for all health workers proving
care to Ebola patients (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and World Health Organization, 1998). Nor is
there any explanation for the inconsistency in lower levels
of protection recommended for HCWs compared to those
for laboratory scientists working with Ebola. The hospital
is a far more contaminated and unpredictable environment
than the laboratory, making the lower level of protection
recommended for HCWs difﬁcult to understand. The WHO
has not provided any transparent, evidence-based reason-
ing or added any references to support their insistence on
medical masks for Ebola (WHO, 2014d).
PPE guidelines for infection control have been tradi-
tionally driven by the paradigm that infections are
transmitted by contact, droplet or airborne routes, and
that these are mutually exclusive routes. Central to this
view is the belief that only large droplets are found close to
the patient, and that smaller aerosolized droplet nuclei
travel further from the source. This is based on experi-
ments performed by aerobiologists from the 1940s and
1950s using much less sophisticated measuring tools than
those available today (Brosseau and Jones, 2014; Wells et
al., 1948, 1946; Wells, 1943). Current evidence is that both
small and large droplets may be present close to the
patient, that aerosol transmission can occur in close
proximity to the source, and that aerosols can be generated
even without AGPs (Brosseau and Jones, 2014). In other
words, modern methods show that pathogen transmission
is far more complex than suggested by these outdated
experiments, and that most pathogens can be transmitted
by several modes (MacIntyre et al., 2014a). Inﬂuenza is a
good example, which has traditionally been believed to be
primarily droplet spread, yet more recent work demon-
strates that it can also be spread by the airborne route
(Blachere et al., 2009). It has been argued that it is time to
reject the paradigm of droplet versus airborne transmis-
sion as artiﬁcial, which then removes the major premise
upon which PPE guidelines have been made until now
(Brosseau and Jones, 2014).
At the same time as recommending medical masks for
HCWs, health authorities have conveyed certainty about
Ebola transmission (CDC, 2014c,d). The CDC states that
Ebola can only be transmitted by direct contact with blood
and bodily ﬂuids (CDC, 2014c). However, Ebola is poorly
studied compared with other infections, being previously
limited to small outbreaks since its discovery in 1976
(Pourrut et al., 2005). To put it in perspective, on Pubmed
(National Institutes of Health, 2014) there are some 80,000
scientiﬁc publications on inﬂuenza compared to a mere
2000 or so on Ebola, a large proportion published during
the 2014 epidemic (MacIntyre, 2014a). Therefore there is
no basis for being certain about Ebola transmission, the
understanding of which is central to PPE recommendations
and control of the epidemic.
The principal mode of transmission is through direct
contact with blood and bodily ﬂuids or contaminated
medical instruments (including needlestick injuries),
however, several animal studies have shown transmission
without direct contact (Dalgard et al., 1992; Jaax et al.,
1995; Johnson et al., 1995). The most extensively studied
human outbreak was in 1995 in Kikwit in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. In this outbreak, there were 55 cases of
Ebola where the risk factor for infection was initially
unknown. A detailed epidemiologic investigation identi-
ﬁed plausible risk factors for most of these, but 5/19 cases
who visited an Ebola patient in their home became infected
without direct contact (Roels et al., 1999). More questions
have been raised from the 2014 Ebola epidemic in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where eight cases are
described as having occurred within the incubation period
of the index case, but without direct contact with that case
(Maganga et al., 2014). To add to this uncertainty, it has
been documented that numerous health workers using PPE
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ct contact (Cohen, 2014). The likelihood of respiratory
smission being a secondary mode of transmission is
her supported by the ﬁnding of high levels of Ebola
s in the lung (Martines et al., 2015). Yet the sum of this
dence has repeatedly been ignored or its relevance
imized in the current PPE controversy.
A common public health message in developed
ntries is that Ebola is ‘‘hard to catch’’. More likely
en current experience is that it is more effectively
ted and treated earlier in developed countries, rather
n harder to catch. The apparent contradiction inherent
his oft-chanted mantra is obvious when we consider
t:
he epidemic in West Africa was amplifying exponen-
ially until October 2014.
ealth workers using full PPE (including in the US and
pain) have become infected.
he reproductive number of Ebola in this outbreak is
onsistently estimated to be around 2 (Althaus, 2014;
isman et al., 2014; Meltzer et al., 2014; Nishiura and
howell, 2014), which is the same as pandemic
nﬂuenza. In some outbreaks, such as in the DRC
Maganga et al., 2014) and Nigeria (Fasina et al.,
014), the R0 from the index case has been between
2 and 21, which is higher than most known infectious
iseases. In comparison, MERS Coronavirus, has a much
ower R0, estimated to be around 1 or less (MacIntyre,
014b).
bola results in an enormously high viral load in the
lood and body ﬂuids, the likes of which are not seen
ith other viruses (Martines et al., 2015; Wong et al.,
014).
We have argued for use of the precautionary principle
Ebola given the uncertainties around transmission, the
h viral load, the high case fatality rate, and the absence
roven treatments or vaccines (MacIntyre et al., 2014a).
re is also the potential that the rigor of wearing N95
sks may prevent work-arounds and emphasize the
ortance of protective principles.
It is also important to ask why so many health workers
ng PPE and with no history of direct contact, and others
h only minimal contact have become infected (Cohen,
4; MacIntyre, 2014c). Whilst authorities have blamed
aches in infection control protocols, there are at least
ee explanations as to why health workers who
owed PPE guidelines may have become infected
cIntyre, 2014c). It may well be true that there could
e been lapses in infection control or that mistakes with
ning and dofﬁng could have been made. However,
ay equally be true that the PPE guidelines were likely
 sufﬁcient for protecting health workers from second-
 modes of transmission such as aerosols. A third
lanation is that health workers may have been infected
ewhere other than while providing clinical care to
la patients, which is possible in the West African
ting, a scenario supported by Dr Kent Brantley who
ieves this to be the case, as he used strict PPE in the
la ward (Cohen, 2014). Several health professionals
from Sierra Leone, including the leading viral hemorrhagic
fever expert Dr Sheik Hummar Khan and the head nurse of
the Lassa fever Ward, Mbalu Fonnie, used full PPE and still
succumbed to Ebola (Vogel, 2014). It is speculated that
others among their colleagues became infected in the
community and not at work, but there is no proof as to
where they acquired the infection (Vogel, 2014).
A reasoned approach to understanding health worker
infections with Ebola must consider all possible explana-
tions. In the US and Spain, the third explanation of
infection outside the clinical care setting is unlikely, which
means lapses in protocol and faulty guidelines must both
be considered. In Spain, the infected nurse was blamed for
her infection (Fischer et al., 2014), reportedly contaminat-
ing her face with a glove as she doffed. Yet recall bias is
likely in this situation, where an infected nurse, if asked a
leading question, is likely to remember perceived risks
differently to a nurse who is not ill. Whilst lapses in
protocol are possible, particularly when staff are
exhausted, inadequate guidelines and recommendations
must also be considered, as they were in the US following
the infection of two nurses. The second US nurse to become
infected was surprisingly considered a ‘‘low risk’’ contact
because she had nursed an Ebola patient using recom-
mended PPE, and was therefore allowed to catch a ﬂight
whilst incubating (and possibly in the early stages of) the
infection (Davidson, 2014). Why was a nurse who treated
the patient considered a low risk contact?
Ebola is clearly a serious occupational health and safety
risk for health workers, many of whom have become
infected despite using PPE. For example, in the Kikwit
outbreak, attending a funeral increased the risk of infection
by three times, whereas being a HCW increased it by 9
times (Roels et al., 1999). At the time of our original
editorial, no Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) worker had
been infected (MacIntyre et al., 2014a), but in the short
space of two months since then, 23 MSF workers have
become infected, despite their strict protocols (MSF, 2014).
This risk to HCWs must be recognized and reﬂected in
conservative guidelines for protection.
During this epidemic, governments and agencies
planning for Ebola have drawn on lessons from pandemic
inﬂuenza planning. This is helpful in some instances, but
dangerous in others—Ebola is unlike inﬂuenza in several
respects, including the major biological waste manage-
ment issues and the vastly higher case fatality rate. The
case fatality rate of Ebola is 50–90% which is far higher
than the 2009 inﬂuenza pandemic (0.01%) (WHO, 2009)
and even SARS (9.6%) (WHO, 2014e). Even the lower case
fatality rate observed in the US is orders of magnitudes
higher than the last pandemic of inﬂuenza. The
consequence of making mistakes with inﬂuenza guidelines
may be a few weeks off work, but for Ebola, there is a high
probability of death, so there is far less margin for error in
formulating guidelines for infection control.
In infection control, most guidelines which heath
workers are asked to follow, such as guidelines for
vaccination, inserting intravenous lines or for handwash-
ing, are driven primarily by concerns about patient safety
and protecting patients from nosocomial infection. In
hospital infection control, patient safety is important
C.R. MacIntyre et al. / International Journal of Nursing Studies 52 (2015) 899–903902because they are ill and vulnerable, may be immunosup-
pressed, and a healthcare associated infection may
adversely impact on overall morbidity and mortality.
The discipline of infection control has developed from a
patient safety perspective primarily (Brosseau, 2014),
which may explain the sometimes casual approach to
HCW protection witnessed during this Ebola epidemic.
With Ebola, HCWs too are vulnerable, and are at high
occupational risk for infection. The primary purpose of
guidelines for Ebola PPE should be the protection,
occupational health and safety of the HCW as well as
preventing transmission of infections. Given the desperate
global shortage of HCWs, particularly in West Africa (Chen
et al., 2004), and the importance of maintaining a health
workforce which is conﬁdent about their own safety, it is
critical that they be afforded the best protection possible
when dealing with a formidable disease such as Ebola.
The Ebola epidemic has also cast a spotlight on
emerging infectious diseases and has highlighted uncer-
tainty, inconsistency and ambiguity in guidelines during
an emerging epidemic (Cowling and Yu, 2014). The
epidemic ravaging Africa has cast a spotlight on the need
to deal with uncertainty and in the case of equipoise, one
should move forward with a judicious and measured
approach to managing risk. Understanding knowledge,
attitudes, beliefs and human behaviors are likely to be as
important to the protection of HCWs as is the understand-
ing the biology of the virus. In order to protect the health of
the individual, scientists and health care professionals
need to be responsive to an evolving understanding of
epidemiology and biology and not be hesitant in challeng-
ing previous recommendations in light of emerging
evidence or ﬁeld observations.
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